Make Conga Lines Great Again

Thoughts on Vehicle Pursuits

In early 2018 I was working as a senior officer assigned to the Violent Criminal Apprehension Team (VCAT).  This is an undercover unit made up of all SWAT operators.  Their main goal is to track down people who are wanted for violent felonies and arrest them.  VCAT will sometimes respond to assist on high priority calls or in progress crimes if they are available or if the call supersedes the operation they are working.  On this day there was a pursuit coming northbound on I-5 from Los Angeles towards Bakersfield involving a man driving an RV.  He was wanted for domestic violence, assault with a deadly weapon, and kidnapping.  He was armed with a .357 revolver and had his three-year-old son and nine-month-old daughter in the RV with him.  He was being pursued by the California Highway Patrol who had taken over for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. 

              We had about 30 minutes before he was going to pass through town so we got our SWAT armored vehicle (Bearcat) and staged in it near a northbound freeway on ramp.  As the suspect vehicle and the pursuing officers passed, we entered the freeway and followed along.  The suspect exited the freeway and then drove around inside the city limits for about 15 minutes before getting back on freeway 99 northbound.  By this time the Kern County Sheriff’s Office SWAT team had joined the pursuit with both of their Bearcats.  There were a total of about 30 law enforcement vehicles in this pursuit which was continuing during midafternoon hours with normal traffic conditions.  Aside from failing to yield, the suspect driver was obeying most other traffic laws and he never exceeded 60 mph on the freeway.  Unlike many of our high-speed pursuits, he posed a minimal public safety risk to other motorists on the road.

              The pursuit continued northbound and once it left the Bakersfield City limits, we were ordered to discontinue the pursuit.  It was relayed to us that the commander at CHP headquarters in Sacramento ordered all allied agencies to stop following.  Now that it was back on the freeway they were taking control and their policy was two officers and a supervisor for a pursuit.  We begrudgingly obeyed and exited the freeway.  About one mile later, the suspect exited the freeway and began circling an almond orchard.  We listened as the officers advised he pulled over and that they had initiated a high-risk stop.  Then, they requested the tactical units, us and the KCSO SWAT team, respond to assist because the suspect was refusing to exit.  We responded and began working the problem.

              The short version of what happened next is we quickly figured out the suspect had immediately abandoned the vehicle and fled into the orchard.  We later learned he had turned on the gas in the kitchen and handed his son a lighter which he told him to light when he fled.  He had about a 20 minute head start and we had about an hour of daylight left.  We located live .357 magnum ammunition he had dropped in the direction he fled which indicated he was still armed and carrying extra ammo.  We suggested we start a search immediately before the sun set, but again we were ordered to stand down so that the air unit could fly over and attempt to locate him.  I mentioned that the air unit could not see through the canopy created by the almond trees and that this was a useless tactic and waste of our dwindling daylight, but my protest was ignored.  We waited about thirty minutes for the air unit to arrive and do a flyover and by the time they finished their search night time had completely set in.  Then, we were told to drive the perimeters of the orchards and use our spotlights to search for the suspect.  To no one’s surprise, we were unable to locate him and he had officially escaped.  He was located two days later by the U.S. Marshalls on a cargo train in the middle of the Mojave Desert.

              There were many takeaways and good lessons learned for me on this operation.  How was it really possible that a guy driving an RV at slow speed in an open agricultural area while being pursued by 30 law enforcement vehicles, including two SWAT teams, was able to evade capture?  It was failure by everyone in every direction that allowed this guy to get away.  For my part, I had a clear shot on him from the Bearcat turret while he was moving at slow speed toward us with a perfect back drop.  I did not take the shot because I was waiting for authorization from my supervisor, but as a 10-year veteran and SWAT sniper, I should have known that the decision to shoot or not to shoot was mine and would have to be justified by me no matter what the supervisor’s orders were.  Other obvious failures were the many missed opportunities to deploy tire deflation devices and the centralized command coming from someone hundreds of miles away as opposed to a decentralized command with on the ground leaders making decisions based on their first-hand assessments of the situation.  Then there were the poor tactics and delay which gave the suspect more than an hour head start before we even decided to look for him.  But the biggest failure in my opinion is the outdated policy of two officers and a supervisor.

              This is a common policy in most agencies including our own.  It’s not clear where this came from or why it still exists but I suspect there is some institutional inbreeding happening here.  This occurs when a charismatic leader teaches a tactic, technique, or procedure that is fitting for the time and place or is taught in a convincing enough manner that it does not get the proper scrutiny.  As time goes on and the TTP becomes or continues to be outdated, it gets continually passed along without questioning and if it is questioned the common response is, “That’s the way we’ve always done it.”  Hint: if you ever get that response, you should immediately dig deeper because there is a high likelihood you have uncovered some institutional inbreeding.  The most common reason given for only allowing two officers and a supervisor is “public safety.”  It has been relayed to me that having more than the three cars in the pursuit forms a “conga-line” and that this is unsafe because a line of 10, or even 30 cars in some cases, is more dangerous to the other motorists than the line of three.  The alternative given to the other officers who don’t make the three-car cut is to parallel the pursuit and to try to anticipate where it is going to end so they can be ready to assist with taking the suspect into custody.  Unfortunately, this is all bullshit.  It is regurgitated nonsense with no basis in public safety or good tactics. 

              Let’s start with the high-risk car stop technique.  This is what we use when we know the suspect is wanted for a felony or we have reason to believe they pose a danger to officers or the public.  A normal traffic stop involves a vehicle pulling over to the side of the road and a single officer, or two officers in the case of a two-officer unit, walk up and make direct contact with the driver and other occupants.  This is the “license and registration” car stop that most of us have been on the receiving end when we drove a little too fast or rolled a stop sign.  The high-risk car stop is the other type that occurs in dangerous situations and is the exact tactic that is used when a pursuit ends with the suspect yielding or if the vehicle becomes disabled and the suspect does not immediately flee on foot.  Basically, two patrol cars will stop behind the suspect vehicle side by side with all their front doors open.  Four officers will take up positions behind each of the open doors and then the suspects will be directed out of their vehicle and brought back to the officers one at a time where they will be searched and handcuffed from the safety of the patrol cars.  This is the safest form of a car stop and is only reserved for suspects who are believed to be a danger.  You will not be called out of your vehicle at gunpoint for going 40 miles per hour in a school zone.  Now I failed Algebra in high school so my math skills are not the best, but if a high-risk stop requires at least four officers, how exactly do you perform this with two officers and a supervisor?  So, the suspect takes us on a pursuit and we kick out all the officers after the third car, then he decides to pull over and we tell him to wait in the car so we can call for more officers?  Smart.

              What about public safety?  It’s not safe to have 10 or 15 cars chasing after one suspect because that increases the risk of a traffic accident.  Really? My experience has been that when a pursuing officer is involved in a traffic accident, it happens to the one of the officers who is trying to get to the pursuit or to the first or second unit in the pursuit as they enter an intersection.  When the dreaded “conga-line” forms, the tenth officer in the pursuit never crashes because by the time they enter the intersection, it has been cleared by nine police cars with flashing lights and sirens.  The officers who pose the greatest risk to public safety are the first three in the pursuit.  Everyone after that is driving through cleared territory and poses almost no threat to other motorists.  Paralleling officers on the other hand can cause a serious risk because they are all operating as individuals without the assistance of other officers’ lights and sirens, and they often are not using their lights and sirens since they are not actively engaged in the pursuit.  In my opinion, paralleling should only be done by officers who are equipped with tire deflation devices who are trying to get into position to disable the suspect vehicle. 

              Lastly, how do we take a suspect into custody when they do not surrender and submit to a high-risk car stop?  Most people who are committed enough to flee in a vehicle, will flee on foot when they are no longer able to use their vehicle or when they get to a position where they think they can evade capture by abandoning the vehicle.  Since this is usually what happens, we are well versed in what to do next.  The first officers will usually pursue on foot and the next responding officers will start to set up a perimeter.  In these instances, the more officers we have the better our chances of catching the suspect(s) and the safer it is for our officers.  Now if you are the tenth officer in the conga-line, it is really easy to figure out the best place to go and the best way you can help solve the problem.  If you are able to see the suspect you can directly pursue them.  If the suspect vehicle still needs to be cleared you can clear it.  Or, you can pay attention to the direction of the foot pursuit and maneuver to a good perimeter position to cut them off or receive them yourself.  It is much more difficult to assist the officers at the end of a pursuit if you are not in the pursuit.

              In closing, I see no tactical or public safety related reason for the two officers and a supervisor policy.  I am often wrong and open to the idea of being wrong on this topic, but I still have not found anyone who can tell me how.  Fortunately, the policy allows supervisor discretion to have as many officers as they see fit in a pursuit and I have never seen a pursuit in my agency that was restricted to only two officers and a supervisor.  The problem is this is a policy that has not been analyzed for its merits and just continues to get passed along.  In absence of critical thinking, this policy might get followed as written and that doesn’t benefit anyone except the suspect who is trying to evade capture.  I like it when we catch the bad guy, keep the public safe, and minimize the risk to our officers.  We can more effectively do all three of those things when we ignore this policy and would probably do everyone good to get rid of it all together.  If I’m wrong, please tell me how.